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1. What there might be and what there is: an introduction to Canonical 
Typology
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Abstract 
This chapter introduces the volume and discusses the issue of data comparability in 
linguistic typology. Key concepts of Canonical Typology, including the base, criteria 
and the canonical ideal (canon), are introduced and exemplified. Desirable properties 
of canonical typologies are outlined, and the framework is discussed in relation to 
other approaches. Summaries are given of each of the chapters in the volume. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Data comparability is a fundamental problem within typology and it has far reaching 
implications for our ability to define natural languages. Haspelmath (2007) 
characterises the problem in the following way: 
 
Which are the right categories for a given language? É For descriptive linguists, there 
would have to be a list that contains the pre-established categories that general linguists 
have figured out in some way. These would not necessarily have to be innate, but they 
would have to be universal in the sense that a descriptive linguist can be sure that the 
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categories needed for describing his/her language are on the list. (Haspelmath 2007: 
120-121) 
 
The issue of correspondence between similarly named features in different languages 
is a substantial part of the data comparability issue. Corbett (2008a) calls this the 
Correspondence Problem: 
 
The Correspondence problem: as typologists we need to be able to justify treating 
features and their values as comparable across languages. This is not straightforward, 
and yet a good deal of typology, including enterprises such as the World Atlas of 
Language Structures (WALS), depends upon it. (Corbett 2008a) 
 
In relation to morphosyntactic features, the correspondence problem can be illustrated 
by the notion of past tense. Languages can divide the notional space of anteriority in 
different ways, taking into account the remoteness of the event (the most striking 
example from Dahl and VelupillaiÕs (2008) chapter in WALS is the Yagua language 
that distinguishes five degrees of remoteness) and/or the aspectual characteristics of 
the event, and it is impossible to know by the label what sort of oppositions the tense 
in a certain language is part of. So when we see in a typological database that Russian 
and Tigrinya have simple past tense, we should not infer that the feature covers the 
same space in both languages: in Russian, simple past occurs with perfective and 
imperfective aspect and is opposed to non-past. In Tigrinya simple past denotes only 
resultative events, and is opposed to stative past (Dahl, 1985: 115-120). As Dahl puts 
it, Òthe distribution of PAST depends largely upon what is left when the other 
categories have taken their share of the pieÓ (Dahl, 1985: 117).  
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The Correspondence problem is not just an issue for our treatment of features 
cross-linguistically, it also affects comparison within languages, because a given 
phenomenon may vary in its properties in the same language. We illustrate the issue 
in relation to the notion ÔagreementÕ as applied to a specific language, Russian. In the 
examples in (1), the controller of agreement, a pronoun, is overtly masculine in (1a),  
and feminine in (1b).  
 
(1) a. on pisal 
  3SG.M write.PST[SG.M] 
ÔHe was writing.Õ 
 
 b.  ona pisal-a 
  3SG.F write.PST-SG.F 
   ÔShe was writing.Õ 
 
It might be taken as a defining characteristic of agreement that the controller and 
target of agreement mark the same feature value. So (1a), and (1b) are instances of 
agreement, because the value on the verb matches that on the controller pronoun. In 
contrast, this might lead one to discount (2a) and (2b) as agreement, because of the 
absence of overt gender on the controller. 
 
(2)  a. ja pisal 
  1SG write.PST[SG.M] 
ÔI was writing.Õ (man talking) 
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 b.  ja pisal-a 
  1SG write.PST-SG.F 
   ÔI was writing.Õ (woman talking) 
 
The point is that constructions such as (2a) and (2b) share some, but not all, of the 
properties we associate with the notion ÔagreementÕ. This is one of the reasons why 
Corbett (2006) used the canonical approach to define agreement.  
Canonical Typology seeks to avoid the tendency to use linguistic terms with 
vague and shifting definitions by placing emphasis on the criteria used to associate 
particular linguistic phenomena with cross-linguistic categories. It therefore demands 
greater detail and rigour in terms of description, because it requires the typologist to 
be clear about the basis on which a phenomenon might be considered an instance of a 
particular concept. In other words, Canonical Typology addresses the issue of how 
cross-linguistic concepts can be accurately related to specific categories in a given 
language (the relationship between comparative concepts and descriptive concepts as 
they are called in Haspelmath (2010a: 363) and references there. Canonical Typology 
shares the focus on the need for detail, as underlined by Haspelmath (2007: 125), for 
example. However, it places greater emphasis on the use of consistent criteria and 
multiple dimensions as a way of addressing the Correspondence Problem. We now 
turn to the description of the Canonical Typology method and its basic conceptual 
apparatus.  
1.2 Doing Canonical Typology 
Key concepts of the canonical method are: i) the base; ii) criteria; and iii) the 
canonical ideal (or canon). The base defines the broad space of particular linguistic 
phenomenon to be described by the typologist. It is defined in such a way that it will 
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include a wide variety of instances, some of which may be considered to be quite far 
from the ideal example of the particular category under investigation. We discuss the 
base in the next section, ¤0. The canonical method allows the typologist to account 
for the set of possible instances in languages, by employing sets of criteria to describe 
how well they approximate to the ideal instance of the particular category. We explain 
criteria further in ¤0. As we explain in ¤0, taken together, the dimensions define a 
space for which there is one point which is the canonical ideal (or canon). We now 
turn to the starting point of a canonical typology, the base.  
1.2.1 The base 
Canonical typologies plot a multidimensional space in which particular linguistic 
objects differ in terms of their proximity to a point of convergence which is the 
canonical ideal. In practical terms the question naturally arises how that space is 
defined more broadly, even before we consider how it is to be divided up. There are 
two possibilities here. Either the theoretical space, the base, is defined by a long-
standing debate about what counts as an instance of the phenomenon in question, or a 
notional starting point (a base or first approximation) needs to be defined. Bond (this 
volume) illustrates how one can create a notional starting point for the investigation of 
negation. He identifies 5 key properties which a base should have. Paraphrased, these 
are: 
 
¥ it should be broad in coverage so as to be inclusive 
¥ it should be minimal description of the phenomenological domain 
¥ it should contain sufficient information to determine whether the 
phenomenon exists in the languages under investigation 
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¥ it should be supported by empirical evidence from other linguistics sub-
disciplines  
 
An example base or first approximation for, say, inflectional classes might look 
something like the following: 
 
INFLECTIONAL CLASS 
For a given language an inflectional class is one of a set of classes which cross-cut 
syntax and which define the forms for words belonging to the same syntactic 
category. 
 
We can see that this is a relatively minimal definition, which could cover a broad 
range of phenomena, some corresponding to our intuitions of inflectional class less 
than others. It expresses something about the relationship between word forms and 
syntactic categories.  
Once the domain under investigation is broadly defined by the base, we use criteria 
to define the dimensions which cover this domain, and so we turn to these.  
1.2.2 Criteria 
The Canonical Typology approach to the correspondence problem is to define sets of 
dimensions for the phenomenon in question in order to calibrate the position of a 
particular construction in relation to the ideal definition. Criteria are used to define 
these dimensions, and they state which points represent the more canonical, and less 
canonical, instances along the dimension. This allows for systematic treatment and 
can be used to discriminate between instances. To illustrate, we return to the Russian 
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examples in (1) and (2), considering them in terms of two of the criteria defined by 
Corbett (2006) for agreement.  (Here Ô>Õ means more canonical than.) 
 
C-1: controller present > controller absent (Corbett 2006: 10) 
 
The examples in (1) and (2) are canonical from the perspective of this criterion, as 
there is a controller present in all of them. This contrasts with C-2. 
 
C-2: controller has overt expression of agreement features > controller has 
covert expression of agreement features (Corbett 2006: 11) 
 
There is no gender distinction in the controller ja ÔIÕ in (2a) and (2b), as opposed to 
examples (1a) and (1b), where the pronouns are overtly masculine or feminine. 
Consequently the examples in (1a) and (1b) are more canonical than (2a) and (2b) 
from the perspective of criterion C-2. Canonical Typology addresses the 
correspondence problem by defining different dimensions and so deals with it by 
treating correspondence as a matter of convergence on an ideal, with some instances 
further from the ideal than others. For agreement, for example, (2) is further from the 
ideal for canonical controllers than (1). Criteria can be used to define a set of 
possibilities which account for the broad typological space covered by the base, and 
they allow us to determine where a particular construction is located within this space. 
Convergence on a canonical ideal indicates that it is possible to define a 
phenomenon consistently. A particular challenge in defining criteria so that there is 
convergence on an ideal is determining the number and nature of different 
dimensions. For instance, in their discussion of the canonical clitic, Spencer and Lus 
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(this volume) argue that this needs to be understood in terms of the orthogonal 
dimensions which define affixes and function words respectively. They argue that 
there is no unique set of properties which defines clitics and excludes other types of 
element. Instead, a clitic which best approximates to the canonical ideal is one which 
has the canonical form properties of an affix and the canonical distribution properties 
of a function word. The strategy adopted in addressing the problem is similar to that 
of Brown, Chumakina, Corbett, Spencer and Popova (forthcoming) where periphrasis 
is defined in terms of the dimensions which define syntax and morphology, so that 
there is no need to make appeal to unique specific properties. Instead, the 
phenomenon is understood in terms of the criteria which define the syntax and 
morphology components more broadly.  
In their simplest form criteria define dimensions for which there are two 
possible values: the canonical value and the non-canonical value. For example, 
Spencer and Lus use the notion of phonological dependence to defining the 
distributional independence (DwdInd) of a word. 
 
DwdInd: A function word is not phonologically dependent on another 
word (Spencer and Lus, this volume) 
 
Likewise CorbettÕs work on morphosyntactic features defines compositionality in 
terms of predictability.  
 
Compositionality: Given the lexical semantics of a lexical item and a 
specification of its feature values, the meaning of the whole is fully predictable. 
(Corbett, this volume) 
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We can think of the dimensions defined by these two criteria as having two points 
associated with them. That is, they may or may not hold. In this simple case we have 
a dimension <0,1>. People are naturally drawn to thinking of dimensions as lines, but 
we must bear in mind that we are dealing with linguistic objects. In the case of certain 
dimensions, as we have noted, there may well be no mid-point between the two ends 
of the dimension, because either the criterion holds, or it does not. In principle, 
however, the space defined by the criteria may contain dimensions which differ in 
their nature (i.e. in terms of the number of points in the dimension, and whether the 
dimension is discrete or gradient). 
While we can recognize an instance which is totally canonical (i.e. a linguistic 
object which is at the canonical end of every dimension), when we speak of one thing 
being less canonical than something else, this often has to be understood in relation to 
a particular dimension. As we explain in our discussion of the canonical ideal in the 
next section, constructions may be equally non-canonical for different reasons, and 
non-canonicity involves a partial ranking. 
1.2.3 The canonical ideal 
For a given linguistic phenomenon once we have a base and a set of criteria which 
describe the space covered by the base, we are in a position to determine the 
canonical ideal. We can conceive of the canonical ideal as the point of convergence, 
and the criteria as dimensions of the space covered by the base. In some approaches, 
the criteria may operationalize particular overarching principles. For example, in 
Corbett (2006: 10-12) the overarching Principle 1, which states that agreement is 
redundant as opposed to informative, is operationalized by four criteria. In other 
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words we can visualize the notion that agreement is canonically redundant in terms of 
four dimensions in the space.  
In Figure 1 we use a Boolean lattice to illustrate the notion of the canonical 
ideal for four dimensions, each defined by a criterion. As it is a Boolean lattice, a 
criterion either holds or does not hold. We illustrate with the four canonical criteria 
used by Corbett (2006: 10-12) to define the space of agreement controllers. We have 
already seen criteria 1 and criteria 2 earlier in our discussion of Russian examples (1) 
and (2). Criterion 3 requires that the agreement controller be consistent in the values it 
takes in order to be canonical for this dimension (2006: 11), and criterion 4 states that 
the part of speech of the controller should be irrelevant in order to be canonical for 
that dimension (2006: 12). Both (1) and (2) are canonical with respect to criteria 1, 3 
and 4, but differ in relation to criterion 2. 
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Figure 1: Proximity to the canonical ideal 
 
At the top of the lattice all four criteria hold, and this represents the canonical ideal 
for the four dimensions which deal with the space of agreement controllers in 
CorbettÕs typology. Both examples in (1) are canonical with respect to all four 
criteria, while example (2), as we have seen, has no overt expression of agreement 
features on its controller and is therefore non-canonical with respect to criterion 2. So 
it is located at the point on the lattice where criteria 1, 3 and 4 hold, but 2 does not 
(namely, C1/C3/C4). It is located one level below example (1), and this gives a 
measurement of its non-canonical nature. It is important to note that there are three 
other possibilities which would be equally as non-canonical as example (2), but for 
different reasons, the three points labelled C1/C2/C4, C1/C2/C3 and C2/C3/C4 on the 
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lattice. While there is only one way to be totally canonical, it is possible for 
constructions to be equally non-canonical in different ways. But it is also possible for 
some constructions to be more non-canonical than others. At the level down from 
where example (2) is located on the lattice we could place (3) at the C3/C4.  
 
(3) da, pisal 
 yes write.PST[SG.M] 
ÔYes, I wrote it.Õ  
(In reply to the question, ÔDid you write the letter?Õ) 
 
Here the subject pronoun is absent, and so this construction is also non-canonincal 
with respect to criterion 1, being canonical only with respect to criteria 3 and 4. This 
means that it is less canonical than (2), as well as (1).  
The canonical space is therefore populated by variants of constructions. As we 
have seen, the instances in (1), (2) and (3), although belonging to the same language 
(Russian), are variants of the agreement construction, but appear at different points in 
the space for the canonical typology of agreement. Informally, we may talk in holistic 
terms of one language being more or less canonical than another with respect to a 
particular construction, but what we really mean is that certain constructions of a 
particular language are more canonical than those of another. Canonical Typology is a 
method for comparing languages. While allowing us to move beyond the bottleneck 
of terminology, it also permits us to move towards predictive measures that are not 
dependent on straightforward hierarchies. For instance, it would be possible to ask 
whether canonicity in one dimension for a particular language might predict 
canonicity in another dimension. It also raises the question of the extent to which 
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particular parts of the lattice will be favoured in comparison with others. In Canonical 
Typology it is possible for there to be many different dimensions defining a particular 
phenomenon. This is because it concentrates on outlining the logical possibilities 
before examining all the instances. When we come to look at the instances, it is more 
than likely that a much smaller number of dimensions of variation are doing the work. 
Indeed, the natural thing to do would be to determine whether particular values for 
certain dimensions predict other ones, and this may well mean that, when it comes to 
the actual cross-linguistic reality, certain dimensions, as defined by the criteria, are 
more important than others. Indeed, it is possible to envisage analyses of data where 
the dimensions created using the canonical method are reduced by statistical analyses 
to those which do the most predictive work, as with statistical analysis using 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART), for example (see Baayen 2008: 148-
154).  
The criteria for a canonical typology should themselves be grounded in cross-
linguistic observations about data, so that for a given construction we can always 
determine if the canonical criterion holds, if it does not, or if it is irrelevant for the 
particular construction. This provides the framework with an empirical grounding 
from which it is possible to move to the more abstract analyses required for typology. 
It has always been a methodological step in typology to consider individually 
observable instances and determine which logical combinations of them actually 
occur. The absence of a particular combination of otherwise attested possibilities is 
important. The canonical ideal may be rare or non-existent.  In ¤0 we contrast the 
canonical ideal with prototypes, which we would expect to be frequent. The fact that a 
canonical ideal may be rare or non-existent is informative and tells us something 
about the phenomenon under investigation. Either it turns out that languages do not 
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cluster around this point in the typological space (the set of possibilities as defined by 
the criteria), or the detail suggested by the typology indicates that there is more work 
to do. Evans (this volume), for example shows that both canonical direct and 
canonical biperspectival speech appear to be rare. Either it will turn out that there are 
specific dimensions along which it is more straightforward to represent the shared 
world required for indirect and biperspectival speech, or we are still missing 
significant knowledge of this area. Having used the criteria to map out the space of 
possibilities, theoretical approaches can concentrate on the sets of criteria where 
languages and structures cluster to explain why this is, and linguists can search deeper 
to determine whether the clusterings really are meaningful. 
Our typical expectation would be that the criteria will converge. On the other hand, 
the most common or prototypical instance of a phenomenon may exhibit certain 
inconsistencies with regard to the canonical ideal. This difference is important, 
because it highlights something about languages. In ¤2.4, for instance, we argue that 
Burmeso shows an instance of the canonical inflectional class, because the forms 
across the classes differ in each cell. There is a contrast here between this rare ideal 
and the prototypical inflectional class system, where we often expect to encounter 
sharing of the morphology between the inflectional classes.   
1.2.4 Desirable properties of a canonical typology 
We have noted that the criteria of canonical typologies should have a basis in 
observable data, even though the canonical ideals that they define may not exist. By 
defining the criteria in relation to otherwise observable phenomena, we can ensure an 
important property of the canonical approach, namely that we will be able to 
recognize the canonical examples if we were to come across them. We call this the 
Recognizability Precept.  
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Recognizability Precept 
A canonical ideal must be defined in such a way that it can be generally accepted. 
This is achievable, because the ideal is itself a combination of properties which 
individually can be observed in languages, so that we can recognize it, if we come 
across it. 
 
This property of Canonical Typology also ensures that those instances which 
approximate to the ideal can be calibrated against it. Finally, we should also be wary 
of taking the most easily visible and most familiar examples of a particular 
phenomenon as being the best examples. Greville Corbett refers to this as the Venus 
Precept, because the easy observability of the planet Venus does not mean that it is 
the best example of a planet.  
 
Venus Precept 
The most readily available examples and most commonly discussed instances of 
particular linguistic phenomena may not actually be the best examples. 
 
As an example of the Venus Precept we could consider the notion of inflectional 
class. The most readily available examples for linguists come from Indo-European 
languages, and yet these may not actually be the ones which come closest to the 
canonical ideal. As Corbett (2008b:8) points out, Burmeso, a language of the 
Mamberamo river area of Western New Guinea (Donohue, 2001; Ross, 2005) actually 
has a better example of an inflectional class system, because the inventory of forms 
differs entirely across the classes. 
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Table 1.1: verbal inflectional classes in Burmeso (Corbett, 2008b; Donohue, 2001: 
100, 102) 
  
 assignment inflectional class 1 inflectional class 2  
 
e.g. -ihi- ÔseeÕ e.g. -akwa- ÔbiteÕ 
SG PL SG PL  
I male j- s- b- t- 
II female, animate g- s- n- t-  
III miscellaneous g- j- n- b-  
IV mass nouns j- j- b- b- 
V banana, sago tree j- g- b- n- 
VI arrows, coconuts g- g- n- n-  
 
The Venus Precept naturally forces us to look beyond the most obvious examples, and 
it should remind us that the languages and families often cited as providing the best 
instances of a particular phenomenon could be blocking our view. 
Another desirable property of a canonical typology is that the dimensions 
should be logically independent of each other. This can often be achieved by 
increasing the number of points in the dimension. Consider criterion 10 from 
CorbettÕs (2007a:26) canonical typology of suppletion.   
 
Criterion 10 (Corbett's 2007a canonical typology of suppletion) 
non-overlapping > non-directional overlapping > directional overlapping  
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Corbett uses this dimension to describe the sharing of forms between lexemes. The 
term ÔoverlappingÕ is taken from Juge (1999:183), where it is used to describe the 
pattern of sharing which exists between the verbs ser Ôto beÕ and ir Ôto goÕ in Spanish, 
whereby these use the same forms (fui etc.) in the preterite. Corbett points out that 
these are non-directional overlaps in that it is not clear synchronically which lexeme 
the set of suppletive forms should primarily be associated with. On the other hand, the 
ablative and genitive forms of Latin nemo ÔnobodyÕ are based on the ablative and 
genitive forms of nullus ÔnoneÕ. Corbett terms this Ôdirectional overlapping 
suppletionÕ. What is important to note here is that we have one dimension with three 
points on it. It would have been possible to define two dimensions: one in which non-
overlapping suppletion was more canonical than overlapping suppletion; and one in 
which non-directional overlapping suppletion was more canonical than directional 
overlapping suppletion. But this would have introduced additional complexity into the 
space in that the second dimension would be dependent on the first. This should be 
avoided, if possible, when defining a canonical typology. We call this the Precept of 
Independence. 
 
Precept of Independence 
Define criteria so that the values of one dimension can be determined 
independently of the values of another. 
 
In principle, we should be able to create canonical typologies where any combination 
of values along the defined dimensions is possible. Whether the particular 
combinations are actually to be found is another matter, of course. 
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An ideal property of linguistic typologies is that they should fit into a large 
space and be consistent with analyses of other phenomena, and also point to areas in 
which there is inconsistency or lack of clarity in our knowledge. This is important 
because the bigger long-term aim of typology is to define a space for linguistic 
theorizing wherein a particular account covers as large a set of phenomena as 
possible. In order to do this, however, we need to fit the elements together. A good 
example of this is Nikolaeva and SpencerÕs (this volume) chapter where they show 
how the canonical typologies for modification and possession fit together, as well as 
highlighting the key areas in which they contrast. (Canonical modifiers are adjectives, 
for instance, while canonical possessors are nouns.)  
Given the overarching aim to combine typologies, this leads us to another 
desirable property: 
 
Recyclability 
Criteria for one typology should be created with their recyclability for others in 
mind.  
 
From the foregoing it should be apparent that this represents a cautious approach to 
the creation of typologies in which the categories in which linguists deal can be 
checked against the reality. We do not start out with the assumption that what 
linguists imagine there should be actually exists. Equally, we allow for the range of 
possibilities to emerge. 
1.3 Canonical Typology in context 
While it represents a new move in terms of the set of methodological steps it employs, 
Canonical Typology naturally has affinities with certain current approaches, as well 
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as employing reasoning which is recognized from well established areas. For instance, 
the vowel space as defined by IPA could be understood in terms of the notion of the 
canonical ideal. Ladefoged and Maddieson (1996: 289) point out that JonesÕs (1956) 
cardinal vowel scheme has four levels of height, and the IPA (1989) set has an 
implied seven levels. They argue that while there are clearly more than three levels of 
height, it is doubtful that any language uses this full range. The vowel set therefore 
constitutes logical points of reference, but this does not mean that it represents what is 
cross-linguistically common. This makes it like a canonical ideal; it defines points 
(ideals) which may be approached only rarely in reality. As we have argued, the 
canonical ideal also contrasts with the notion of prototype. In the earliest work on 
prototypes, such as Rosch (1973), prototypes are associated with perceptual salience 
and are therefore natural categories from a cognitive perspective. We can contrast this 
with the notion of a canonical ideal, where the ideal constitutes a point of 
convergence for logically consistent definitions. 
The tradition of work on the notion of Ôcategory squishÕ, starting with Ross 
(1972, 1973/2004), is an important part of the intellectual heritage of the canonical 
method. In this approach syntactic categories, such as noun and verb, are dissolved 
into a number of processes and the familiar word classes are Ôcardinal pointsÕ within 
the continuum of variation that can be found (Sasse 2001: 495). These points are also 
taken to be prototypes. Sasse (2001: 507) notes in concluding his discussion of 
squishes that there is a bias within linguistics towards taking it as given that there is 
necessarily a prototypical relationship between form and meaning. In contrast, 
adopting the methodological position that the points of convergence which are 
canonical ideals are not the same as prototypes, this bias is avoided in Canonical 
Typology. Because it is a typological method, rather than a theory, it allows both for 
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the possibility that certain of the abstractions in which linguists deal fail to be 
instantiated by recognizable groupings of properties and for the possibility that others 
can be. 
The use of multiple dimensions is not unique to the canonical method. For 
instance, their application can be seen in the work of the work of the Cologne 
UNITYP project, as discussed in Seiler (2001). Seiler (2001: 324, 338) emphasizes 
UNITYPÕs ÔteleonomicÕ view of language, namely that it has a goal-driven function 
to represent cognitive-conceptual content. The starting point in such typologies is that 
different structural phenomena can be grouped together because they a Ôcommon 
functional denominatorÕ (Seiler 2001: 323). While particular typologies created using 
the canonical method will make reference to criteria about semantics or particular 
functions of a construction, the canonical method does not take this assumption as its 
starting point, partly because there is evidence that certain systematic structures 
within languages may not readily fit with the view that structure is always determined 
by a need to represent cognitive-conceptual content. Inflectional classes, because they 
create morphological complexity that cross-cuts syntax and semantics, are an example 
of this.  There may well be sound reasons why they exist which have a cognitive 
explanation, but the representation of cognitive-conceptual content need not be one of 
them. 
Idea that a typological phenomenon needs to be described using multiple 
dimensions is employed by Givn whose account of grammaticalization processes of 
pronominal verb agreement uses a set of predictive implicational hierarchies 
(grammatical relations, semantic role, animacy, humanity, definiteness and 
topicalization). The situation in individual languages is defined by different point on 
the hierarchy. The hierarchies are predictive: ÒIf a language would develop obligatory 
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pronominal agreement, it would develop it first for the highest (left-most) category in 
each hierarchic scale (Givn 2001: 414).  
The difference from the canonical typology perspective is that these hierarchies 
are defined according to frequency: Òthese hierarchies must surely be motivated by 
the text-frequency of anaphoric pronominalizationÓ (Givn 2001:426). In contrast, 
canonical typology posits an ideal or best example which may be rare.     
Among current approaches to typology, there are a number which share 
Canonical TypologyÕs use of dimensions. In HymanÕs (2009) property-driven 
approach to typology the properties are used to place Ôpitch accentÕ within a 
typological space. Hyman argues that Ôpitch accentÕ is a concept which has no clear 
and consistently identifiable status, other than being associated with a variety of 
properties otherwise associated with stress or tone. If the properties for stress and tone 
are defined, then pitch-accent systems are positioned at a point far from the best 
examples of either. HymanÕs properties play a role akin to the criteria in Canonical 
Typology. A point of contrast is that Hyman (2009: 215) talks of the prototypical 
being a clustering of the relevant properties which is associated with the ÒbestÓ or 
ÒclearestÓ category. However, prototype is a notion which has psychological import, 
and the canonical method works on the basis that it is best to make a distinction 
between the prototypical and the canonical ideal. As we argued in ¤0 the canonical 
ideal is the best example there could be, whereas the prototype may be the best or 
most accessible instance we can find in a given language. An additional question 
which arises is whether we should allow for certain dimensions to be privileged over 
others. For example, in HymanÕs (2009: 216) set of properties the structural property, 
whereby assignment is determined by metrical structure, is considered definitional for 
stress. In other phenomena, however, we might assume that no one criterion is 
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necessary or sufficient. This will become an increasingly important issue as the 
Canonical Typology framework develops, and we noted in ¤0 that it is best if criteria 
are defined so that the dimensions are independent of each other. 
The criteria of the canonical method can be compared with the use of cross-
linguistic variables in multivariate-based typology, as proposed by Bickel (2010), for 
instance, in his analysis of clause linkage. Bickel uses multivariate analysis to 
uncover correlations in a dataset which differs in terms of a number of variables, such 
as illocutionary scope or constituent extraction, which cover the diversity in clause 
linkage. Bickel argues that the variables should be based on inductive development 
(such as in Bickel and NicholÕs 2002 work on AUTOTYP), rather than a priori 
assumptions about what a grammar should be like. There is a subtle point of contrast 
here with Canonical Typology which identifies criteria that have been observed as 
important for identifying particular phenomena and treats their combination as 
defining an ideal which may be rarely obtained. In this sense, there is greater 
emphasis on what could possibly occur, as opposed to what there is. However, an 
important contribution of BickelÕs analysis of clause linkage is that it demonstrates 
the value of analyzing the variation within a set of related structures to see what is 
cross-linguistically prevalent. 
1.4 Summary 
We noted that Canonical Typology is a response to the Correspondence Problem, 
wherein we cannot be sure that the categories that linguists talk of are actually the 
same or similar cross-linguistically. We take the definitions of the phenomenon in 
question to their logical conclusions to define a space into which we can map 
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linguistic objects from different languages.
2
 Once this has been done we can see how 
they cluster cross-linguistically. Canonical Typology therefore represents a cautiously 
optimistic answer to the question of data comparability both within languages and 
cross-linguistically. We now go on to discuss each of the chapters from the volume. 
1.5 Outline of chapters 
In the first chapter, ÔA base for canonical negationÕ, Oliver Bond outlines the 
methodological objectives of canonical typology (CT) and tries them out in the 
domain of linguistic negation. The first step in any investigation within the canonical 
approach must start with working out the base, which comes before the elaboration of 
the criteria and before examining the linguistic data. Bond defines the requirements 
for the base: it should be minimal in words, and maximally inclusive to avoid being 
language-specific. At the same time, it should be specific enough for a linguist using 
it to be able to recognise whether it makes sense to look for the phenomenon in a 
particular language at all. There is no requirement for the base to contain a functional 
explanation of the phenomenon, or to give reference to the linguistic form. On the 
basis of the existing works which use the approach, Bond distinguishes two types of 
CT: Ôexploratory CTÕ, where the domain of investigation is defined through the base, 
and criteria are established on the basis of the observed cross-linguistic variation and 
Ôretrospective CTÕ, which apply the method to resolve issues arising from long-
standing debates. The chapter represents the first exposition of the methodology for 
defining the starting point in CT: the base for linguistic negation is defined, and 18 
criteria for canonical negation are established. This allows the author to generate a 
                                                
2
 It is worth noting Haspelmath's (2007: 128) point in defence of the notion that semantics constitutes 
substance: "experience shows that people can understand each other across linguistic boundaries with 
some efforts." Ultimately, a shared understanding between linguists of the approximate meanings of 
particular linguistic categories is also an example of this general ability to translate concepts.  
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full description of the canonical instance of linguistic negation without necessarily 
observing it in reality. The base for linguistic negation defines the domain as 
maximally inclusive, so that all syntactic levels are involved: constituent, clausal and 
bi-clausal. Derivational negation is also part of the domain. Another important 
distinction made in this chapter concerns the fact that linguistic negation appears in 
expressions that are not treatable in terms of truth-values (such as imperatives) and 
therefore cannot be defined in the same way as negation in logic.  
ÔCanonical morphosyntactic featuresÕ by Greville G. Corbett tackles the very 
general problem of features. Criteria for canonical morphosyntactic features are based 
on two overarching principles: Òa feature (I) has robust formal marking and (II) is 
constrained by simple rules of syntaxÓ. Ten criteria have been proposed, falling under 
these general principles. However, if we had fully canonical features, meeting all 
these criteria, these features would be indistinguishable one from another (and an 
appeal to semantics does not solve our problem). The chapter therefore examines the 
interaction of canonical morphosyntactic features with canonical parts of speech. The 
latter are defined as those where semantic, syntactic and morphological behaviours 
line up perfectly. Four criteria are proposed for the interaction with morphosyntactic 
features: exclusiveness, exhaustiveness, open/closed class and compositionality. 
Investigation of possible deviations from the canon (understood as a logical endpoint 
where all criteria converge), has an important result of ordering the features according 
to decreasing canonicity, where number comes as the most canonical, followed by 
gender, person, (respect), case and (definiteness), where brackets indicate less clear 
instances of features.  
The chapter on the typology of quotations by Nick Evans argues that 
postulation of the canonical point should further our understanding of observable or 
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recognisable phenomena. Canonical points which represent something not 
instantiated in any language are allowed, but only as long as they serve as points of 
reference for meaningful typological comparison. Evans applies the canonical 
approach to the grammatical means used by languages to mark reported speech. He 
gives definitions of canonical direct and canonical indirect speech, conforming to the 
Òcanonical baseÓ as defined by Bond, in that they are semantic, maximally inclusive 
and not language-specific. The chapter discusses various deviations from these 
criteria. First, it investigates languages where all quotations are basically direct, but 
there are deviations from this in terms of stylistic effects and Òsecond person 
magnetismÓ (usage of the second person for the primary hearer irrespective of what 
had actually been said in the speech reported). Next, the deviations from canonical 
indirect speech are presented, in the same order: first stylistic devices (such as 
expletives), then the grammatical means: the absence of expected tense shift, the 
retention in the imperatives and vocatives, spatial deixis, etc. One can call all these 
Ôsemi-directÕ or Ôsemi-indirectÕ speech. The canonical approach is advantageous in 
that it describes the deviations along different dimensions (style, person, tense, mood, 
politeness etc). The chapter also suggests that there is another canonical point: 
biperspectival speech, with dedicated grammatical means to express the perspective 
of the original and reported speakers simultaneously. There are no canonical instances 
that we know of, yet logophors represent one point in this theoretical space. In this 
respect, the chapter presents a clearly described canonical space for something that 
has not been attested, yet is possible and worth looking for.  
The chapter ÔUnpacking finitenessÕ by Irina Nikolaeva establishes criteria 
which define the canonical point of finiteness. Finiteness has been viewed by 
typologists as a Òscalar ÔmetaÕ-notionÓ characterised by interdependent and 
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hierarchically organized properties. Nikolaeva argues that the implications and notion 
of scale should be abandoned, since no implicational relations suggested for finiteness 
parameters so far have been without exceptions. She claims finiteness to be a clausal 
notion which can be characterised by independent criteria belonging to different 
linguistic components: morphology, syntax and semantics. The suggested criteria are 
of the form Ôtense marking > no tense markingÕ, which reads as Ôovert tense marking 
of finite clauses is more canonical than no tense markingÕ. Seven morphological 
criteria are suggested, involving agreement, marking of tense, mood, politeness and 
evidentiality, switch-reference and nominative subjects. The syntactic criteria deal 
with dependency of the clause, subject licensing and morphosyntactic expression of 
information structure. The semantic criteria concern assertion, independent temporal 
anchoring and information structuring. Each criterion is illustrated with examples 
from typologically diverse languages representing more and less finite clauses.  
All the chapters discussed so far used the canonical approach to clarify the 
notions used in typology or to state the usefulness of a notion like finiteness for cross-
linguistic comparison. The chapter on clitics by Andrew Spencer and Ana Lus uses 
the canonical approach to demonstrate that it can be used to define a linguistic 
phenomenon which has been claimed to fall between affixes and function words. 
Clitics, as the paper claims are affixes in form and function words in distribution 
properties. The authors formulate criteria for canonical words and canonical affixes. 
The criteria are divided into three groups: those dealing with forms (phonology and 
broadly understood morphology), those dealing with distribution (syntax) and those 
dealing with content.  
Anna Siewerska and Dik Bakker tackle another methodological issue of 
canonical typology: how to define whether a particular characteristic belongs to the 
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canonical core. They investigate passive constructions in 279 languages to find out 
whether the expressability of an agent is canonical for passives, taking the definitions 
of a prototypical passive as their departure point. The question of the overt agent is 
the only point where frequency-based and exemplar-based approaches to prototypes 
disagree. The authorsÕ answer within the canonical approach is twofold: a certain 
property is taken to be more canonical than another if that property Òdistinguishes the 
given construction from canonical realizations of other constructionsÓ, and since the 
overt agent distinguishes passive from impersonal, inverse, stative, anticausative and 
such like, its presence is taken to be part of a passive canon. The chapter explores the 
relationship between the expressability of agents and other canonical features of 
passive (both formal and semantic). The frequency of the overt agent in the passive is 
taken to be defining: languages which allow (though not necessarily require) overt 
agents are more frequent (contrary to what the prototype approach states), and 
therefore passive constructions with implicit agents claimed to be more canonical. 
The form of the subject is also important: personal passives are more canonical than 
the impersonal ones, and, as they more often allow the overt agent, it is also a reason 
to consider passives with overt agents more canonical. Other factors influencing the 
canonicity of the overt agent include the obligatoriness of its expression, semantic 
transitivity of the construction, animacy of the agent, its semantic role, and formal 
realization. The chapter concludes that an expressable non-obligatory semantically 
agentive lexical agent realized as an oblique argument is canonical. 
Martin Everaert suggests the canonical criteria for reflexivization. The 
languages of the world employ different strategies to encode the identity between two 
arguments of a clause (a binder and a bindee), the suggested criteria rank them along 
four dimensions: the expression of the binder, the expression of the bindee, the 
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morphosyntactic encoding and the domain. The chapter states that reflexivization is 
Òmorphosyntactically distinct from a pronominal coreference relationÓ and it is 
Òimportant to distinguish the notion ÔanaphorÕ, or Ôanaphoric dependencyÕ from 
reflexive and reflexivizationÓ, and the criteria help to make the necessary distinctions. 
The second issue that the criteria resolve concerns the multiplicity of strategies: in 
general, languages have more than one means to encode reflexivization (nominal 
reflexives, inalienable possession anaphors, null-reflexives and locally bound 
pronouns), and it is important to be able to recognize the canonical core. The 
canonical reflexive relation is between two arguments rather than non-arguments, the 
binder is canonically a definite NP of third person. The bindee is canonically an 
object and the reflexivity is marked on it (rather than on the predicate). The 
morphosyntactic encoding of the reflexive construction is canonically different from 
the encoding of the identity between non-arguments. The domain of the relation is 
canonically a predicate rather than a sentence, and a simple sentence rather than a 
complex one.   
In their chapter on possession-modification scale Irina Nikolaeva and 
Andrew Spencer employ the canonical typology approach to explain the hierarchy 
established by themselves previously: the strategies for encoding dependants of the 
noun respect the monotonicity of the following scale: attributive modifier < 
modification-by-noun < alienable possession < inalienable possession. Defining the 
criteria for the canonical ideal of the construction described by this scale, the authors 
seek to get to the origins of the scale (which was just a result of empirical 
observation). In this respect, the chapter exemplifies a retrospective canonical 
typology as defined by Bond (this volume). The link between modification and 
possession is easily spotted: many languages encode constructions like tall girl and 
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MaryÕs daughter in the same or very similar way. The authors establish semantic, 
formal and syntactic criteria for canonical modification and possession, based on 
which canonical modification construction is defined as a construction headed by a 
noun and containing an adjective which denotes some gradable property, and the 
canonical possession construction is the one denoting inalienable possession and 
expressed by two nouns. Modification by noun and alienable possession constructions 
are viewed as deviations from the canon. The chapter shows that languages respect 
this division into canonical and non-canonical constructions and never use the same 
strategies to encode, say two opposite canonical points in the same way without 
encoding the deviations from the canon in exactly the same way. But that would be 
predicted by the hierarchy above anyway. The interesting result is the uncovering of a 
very frequent strategy where two canonical points are encoded differently, but in the 
same way as the deviations close to them: one strategy for the modifier and 
modification-by-noun and another, different strategy for alienable and inalienable 
possession, so establishing a canonical space deepens our understanding of the 
hierarchy.  
The chapter concluding the volume, by Scott Farrar, applies the canonical 
approach to linguistic ontologies. Linguistics has collected so much data by now that 
(inter)operability and formalization are of increasing importance. To get to this point 
we need the data to be in a standard format, and the terminology used for data 
annotation to be universal. The ultimate goal is to operate on the level of e-linguistics 
where computers are used as Òprimary means to publish, search and visualise the 
descriptive dataÓ. Ill-defined data types and the absence of an infrastructure are a 
barrier to e-linguistics. The chapter suggests that the implementation of the General 
Ontology for Linguistic Description (GOLD) together with Communities of Practice 
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Extensions (COPEs) will resolve these issues. The chapter explains how GOLD is 
structured, what type of entities it contains and what type of predicates to express 
relations between these entities. GOLD is supposed to contain only expressions of the 
highest level of abstraction, which should be applicable to any language and are not 
possible to change once the ontology is built. Examples of such expression are given: 
(1) Òa verb is a part of speech; (2) Òa verb can assign caseÓ etc. COPEs are of a lower 
level of abstraction, they contain the examples where the level of detail can go right 
down to one language. For example, if there is a very unusual grammatical feature 
that is only attested in two languages, and even in these languages it is slightly 
different, then the labels of the feature will contain the name of the language. In this 
respect, ontologies are very close to the canonical approach. The chapter presents an 
example of GOLD implementation and concludes by summarising the parallels 
between canonical typology and principles of building an ontology.  
